MOGADISHU, Somalia – The Houthi movement’s capture of Yemen’s Red Sea port of Mokha and its advance onto Perim Island, at the narrowest point of the Bab al-Mandeb strait, has transformed the strategic environment around the Gulf of Aden.
For Somalia, the consequences could be significant even without a formal closure of the waterway.
The immediate risk is higher shipping, insurance and fuel costs. The longer-term concern is that prolonged instability could disrupt the supply chains on which Somalia depends, intensify a resurgence in piracy and give al-Shabaab an opportunity to turn an international maritime crisis into a domestic propaganda campaign.
The distinction between a closed strait and an increasingly risky strait is important. Commercial vessels are still using Bab al-Mandeb, but the cost of doing so is rising as shipping companies reassess the security environment. Reuters reported on Monday that vessels were continuing to use the waterway even as the Houthi advance increased pressure on the route and pushed tanker rates higher.
That may be the more important story for Somalia.
A strategic shift at Somalia’s doorstep
The geography is difficult to ignore. Bab al-Mandeb connects the Red Sea with the Gulf of Aden and the wider Indian Ocean. On its southern side lies Somalia and the Horn of Africa; on its northern side is Yemen.
The UN special envoy for Yemen said last week that the Houthi offensive had given the group direct access to the approaches to one of the world’s most important maritime chokepoints after the capture of Mokha, roughly 75km from Bab al-Mandeb.
Reuters subsequently reported that the Houthis had taken Perim Island, giving the Iran-aligned movement a strategically significant position overlooking the strait. Reuters described the development as a major shift in the regional balance, with the Houthi presence creating greater leverage over shipping and energy flows.
The significance for Somalia is not that Houthi forces can automatically shut the strait. Rather, their ability to threaten or raise the perceived risk of maritime traffic can have economic consequences long before an actual blockade occurs.
That is how modern shipping crises work. A vessel does not have to be attacked for the route to become more expensive.
Somalia’s economy is particularly exposed
Somalia has limited domestic production and relies heavily on imported food, fuel and manufactured goods. That makes the country particularly sensitive to changes in international freight and energy prices.
The previous Red Sea shipping crisis offers a useful indication of what could happen.
IMF analysis of Somali trade using PortWatch and vessel-tracking data found that traffic and throughput at Mogadishu remained relatively stable during the earlier disruption, but delivery times increased substantially.
Goods arriving from Türkiye took about 14 additional days, while deliveries from Egypt took roughly five extra days and those from Oman and Saudi Arabia about three extra days. The lesson is important: trade does not have to stop for Somalia to feel the impact.
Longer voyages increase fuel consumption, insurance costs, working-capital requirements and the amount of time goods remain in transit. Those costs eventually reach consumers. And Somalia enters the latest crisis from a relatively weak economic position.
The World Bank estimates that economic growth slowed to about 3 per cent in 2025, while it projects growth of only 2.8 per cent in 2026. Inflation is projected to reach about 6 per cent this year, with food, transport and utilities already contributing to household pressure. The country’s electricity system adds another vulnerability.
The World Bank says electricity generation in Somalia is nearly entirely diesel-based. Higher international fuel prices therefore transmit quickly into electricity, transport, production and food costs. A sustained shipping shock around Bab al-Mandeb could consequently affect far more than the price of imported goods. It could raise the cost of doing business across the Somali economy.
The oil-price channel could be even more important
The Bab al-Mandeb crisis is developing at the same time as wider disruptions to Middle Eastern energy routes.
Reuters reported on Monday that Brent crude had risen above $107 a barrel, while US crude was above $102, as markets absorbed threats to shipping through the region. Tanker rates had reached record levels and bunker fuel supplies were tightening.
For Somalia, the transmission mechanism is straightforward. Higher oil prices → higher diesel costs → higher electricity and transport costs → higher food-distribution costs → greater inflationary pressure. That makes developments in Yemen relevant to a Somali household thousands of kilometres away.
It also creates a difficult policy problem for Mogadishu. The government can influence domestic taxation, port efficiency and market regulation, but it cannot control global tanker rates or international oil prices.
Somali traders are already looking for alternatives
There is evidence that Somalia’s private sector understands the changing risk. The Associated Press reported this week that Somali businesses are reconsidering established trade routes because of the escalating insecurity around both Bab al-Mandeb and the Strait of Hormuz.
Mogadishu’s port has begun exploring more direct shipping arrangements, including a recent shipment of sugar from Sri Lanka, rather than relying exclusively on traditional Gulf-linked supply chains. This diversification could become increasingly important if the crisis persists.
But alternative routes are not free. Shipping around Africa, for example, can add weeks to a voyage. Reuters reported that rerouting tankers around the Cape of Good Hope can add about 22 days compared with the Red Sea route, while increasing fuel and chartering costs.
For Somali importers, therefore, the choice may not be between an available route and no route. It may be between an expensive route and an even more expensive alternative.
Piracy adds another layer of risk
The Houthi advance comes as piracy off Somalia is already showing signs of resurgence.
According to recent maritime-security reporting, at least 13 vessels had been attacked this year off Somalia or in the Gulf of Aden by late August, compared with five such attacks recorded during 2025 by the International Maritime Bureau and UK Maritime Trade Operations.
The Joint Maritime Information Center has raised its piracy threat assessment to “severe” following the increase in attacks during April and May, although the current level remains far below the extraordinary piracy wave of the early 2010s.
That qualification matters. Somalia is not returning to the piracy crisis of 2010-12. International naval capabilities, regional co-operation and private maritime security have improved considerably.
But the combination of Houthi instability and renewed piracy creates a more complicated security environment for commercial operators.
A ship travelling from Yemen towards the Somali coast now faces a maritime space in which different threats may overlap without necessarily being part of the same organisation or campaign.
The Houthi-al-Shabaab connection
This is where the Somali dimension becomes particularly sensitive. UN investigations have documented an increasingly active relationship between the Houthis and al-Shabaab.
A UN Panel of Experts reported that cooperation between the two organisations had intensified and included weapons smuggling, technical training and logistical support.
An earlier UN report described the relationship as largely transactional and reported allegations that al-Shabaab sought weapons and training from Houthi representatives, while the group was expected to increase piracy activity in the Gulf of Aden and off Somalia.
These findings do not establish that the Houthis and al-Shabaab operate as a single organisation. That distinction is essential.
The evidence points to cooperation and exchanges, but it would be misleading to treat every Houthi action, pirate attack or maritime incident as part of one unified command structure. The danger is that exaggerating the relationship could itself become part of the propaganda environment.
Al-Shabaab’s biggest opportunity may be propaganda
Al-Shabaab does not need to close a port or control a shipping lane to exploit the crisis. It can exploit the economic consequences and public uncertainty generated by the crisis.
If fuel becomes more expensive, food prices increase or imported goods arrive late, the group can attempt to attribute those problems directly to the Somali government and its international partners.
The argument would be politically convenient even if the underlying economics were more complicated. An increase in the price of cooking fuel could result from global oil prices.
A more expensive shipment could result from international insurance premiums. A delayed cargo could result from a shipping company’s decision to take a longer route.
But a population experiencing higher prices may not distinguish easily between those causes. That creates an information gap. And information gaps are precisely where extremist propaganda can be effective.
The likely propaganda strategy
The most credible concern is not that al-Shabaab will suddenly become a major naval power. It is that the group could portray the regional crisis as evidence of the failure of the Somali state. Several narratives are particularly foreseeable.
The first is that foreign powers cannot protect Somalia’s trade, despite the presence of international maritime forces. The second is that Somalis are paying the economic price for foreign wars and alliances. The third is that the government’s inability to prevent piracy demonstrates weakness.
The fourth is that the deterioration of shipping proves Somalia is becoming internationally isolated. These narratives can contain fragments of truth while drawing conclusions that are unsupported by the evidence. That is precisely what makes them difficult to counter.
The danger of confusing piracy, Houthi activity and al-Shabaab
There is another information risk. The more the public hears about Houthi-al-Shabaab contacts, the easier it becomes to assume that every maritime incident is coordinated between the two groups. That would be a mistake.
Piracy is primarily an economic crime. The Houthis have a broader political and military agenda centred on Yemen and regional power struggles. Al-Shabaab is an extremist insurgent organisation pursuing its own political and ideological objectives inside Somalia.
Their interests can overlap without their operations being identical. For Somali policymakers, journalists and security officials, precision will therefore matter. If the government labels every pirate attack as an al-Shabaab-Houthi operation without sufficient evidence, it risks undermining its own credibility.
If it dismisses genuine cooperation between the groups, it risks underestimating the threat. The appropriate position is between those extremes.
The economic threat is uncertainty
The greatest economic risk may ultimately be neither a blockade nor a single attack. It is uncertainty.
Shipping companies price risk into their decisions. If the possibility of attack becomes sufficiently high, companies may reroute vessels even if most ships continue to pass safely.
That produces a powerful economic effect. A threat does not need to stop trade to make trade more expensive. Reuters reported that ships are still using Bab al-Mandeb, but the cost of maritime transport has risen sharply as the security environment deteriorates.
For Somalia, this means that an apparently functioning port can coexist with rising prices. Cargo can continue arriving while businesses face higher freight bills. Fuel can remain available while electricity becomes more expensive.
Food can remain on supermarket shelves while consumers pay more for it. That is the more plausible near-term transmission mechanism.
A test for Somalia’s economic resilience
Somalia has already demonstrated some capacity to adapt. The search for alternative shipping routes and direct Asian supply lines could reduce dependence on particular Gulf corridors. Regional maritime co-operation is also expanding as governments respond to the resurgence of piracy and other threats.
But the country’s economic room for manoeuvre is limited.
The World Bank says declining aid, drought and rising living costs are already weighing on household welfare, while poverty reduction has stalled. It also warns that food insecurity remains highly sensitive to rainfall, aid flows and price shocks.
That means another external supply shock could have consequences beyond inflation. It could affect household purchasing power, businesses’ ability to operate and the government’s capacity to respond to humanitarian needs.
The policy response
For Mogadishu, the immediate priority should be maintaining the reliability of the country’s ports and supply chains. That means strengthening co-ordination among port authorities, shipping companies, customs agencies, maritime-security bodies and international partners.
The second priority is diversification. The more Somalia can source essential goods through different suppliers and routes, the less vulnerable it becomes to any single maritime chokepoint.
The third is maritime security. The resurgence of piracy means that Somalia’s coastline cannot be considered separately from the wider Red Sea crisis. Regional information-sharing and maritime surveillance will become increasingly important as commercial operators reassess the Gulf of Aden.
The fourth is information management. The government should publish timely information about port operations, shipping arrivals, fuel availability and confirmed maritime incidents.
The objective should not be to minimise the danger. It should be to establish a credible distinction between what has happened, what has not happened and what could happen next.
The bigger geopolitical picture
The Houthi advance also demonstrates how geography can generate political leverage far beyond Yemen. Reuters described the capture of strategic positions near Bab al-Mandeb as giving the Houthis greater leverage over Gulf states, global trade and energy markets.
For Somalia, this reinforces the strategic importance of its own coastline. The country sits alongside one of the world’s most commercially important maritime corridors, yet has historically struggled to translate that geography into economic and security leverage.
The current crisis could force a reassessment. Somalia’s coastline is not simply a security burden. It is an economic asset whose value depends on stability, infrastructure, governance and international confidence.
The Bab al-Mandeb crisis therefore presents an uncomfortable paradox.
The more strategically important the waters around Somalia become, the greater the potential economic value of the country’s ports and maritime position. But the same strategic importance also makes Somalia more exposed to conflicts originating elsewhere.
Somalia’s divided politics meet a turbulent Red Sea
The maritime crisis is unfolding alongside one of Somalia’s deepest political disputes in years. Parliament approved constitutional changes in March that extended the presidential and parliamentary terms from four to five years, effectively moving the next federal elections to 2027.
President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud argues that the additional year is necessary to complete the transition towards a direct electoral system, while opposition leaders and several federal member states reject the extension and say the president’s mandate expired on May 15.
The African Union, IGAD and United Nations have all urged a return to dialogue, underscoring the extent to which Somalia’s electoral dispute has become a question of national political legitimacy.
The deeper problem is not simply the postponed election but the erosion of political consensus around the federal system itself. Puntland and Jubaland have opposed the constitutional changes, while the Somali Future Council has challenged the federal government’s approach and called for a broader political settlement.
The dispute has also spilled into violence: federal forces fought opposition forces in Mogadishu in June, while heavy fighting returned to Baidoa in August between federal troops and forces loyal to former South West state president Abdiaziz Hassan Mohamed Laftagareen.
For a country already confronting al-Shabaab, renewed internal confrontation risks diverting political attention, security resources and international diplomatic capital away from the wider national security challenge.
For Hassan Sheikh, the political cost is therefore larger than the argument over whether the constitutional amendments are legally valid. His government came to office promising a stronger federal settlement, constitutional reform and a transition towards one-person-one-vote elections, but the process has instead left important parts of the political establishment outside the emerging framework.
In a region being reshaped by Red Sea instability, shifting Gulf rivalries, renewed piracy and changing international security priorities, Somalia needs greater internal cohesion, not deeper institutional fragmentation.
The president can still argue that his constitutional project represents a historic attempt to move the country beyond its clan-based indirect electoral system; however, the failure to secure broad political agreement has weakened that project’s legitimacy and reduced the government’s ability to present a united national response to rapidly changing regional dynamics.
The bottom line
The Houthi advance has not yet created a complete maritime blockade of Bab al-Mandeb. But that is not the threshold at which Somalia begins to suffer.
The country can feel the effects through higher insurance premiums, longer voyages, rising fuel prices, more expensive imports and renewed maritime-security concerns while ships continue to sail.
The greatest danger may come from the interaction of three separate shocks: a more dangerous Red Sea, a resurgence of piracy in the Gulf of Aden and a fragile Somali economy. Al-Shabaab could then seek to turn the resulting economic pain into political capital.
The organisation’s most valuable weapon in this environment may not be a maritime capability but a narrative: the claim that Somalia’s government and its international partners are incapable of protecting the country’s trade, economy and coastline. The response should be equally clear.
Somalia cannot control what happens on Yemen’s Red Sea coast. It can, however, strengthen the resilience of its own supply chains, deepen maritime co-operation, diversify import routes and ensure that reliable information reaches the public faster than misinformation.
For Mogadishu, the Bab al-Mandeb crisis is therefore not simply a story about a chokepoint in Yemen. It is a test of whether Somalia can turn its strategic geography from a source of vulnerability into an instrument of economic resilience.
